INTERPRETING OSHA'S PRE-EMPTION CLAUSE:
FARMWORKERS AS A CASE STUDY
Responding to the serious problems of industrial injuries and
occupational disease,' Congress enacted the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA).2 Concerns about duplication
of federal regulations, 3 however, prompted Congress to include
within OSHA a clause-section 4(b)(1) 4-that prevents the Secretary of Laborr5 from regulating working conditions once another
federal agency has exercised "statutory authority to prescribe or
enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety or
health." 6
Section 4(b) (1) has been construed by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Organized Migrants in Community
Action Inc. (OMICA) v. Brennan7 The suit, brought by farm1 The following statistics, brought out in OSHA's legislative history, document
the magnitude of the problem. At that time, industrial accidents were annually
resulting in 14,500 deaths and 2.2 million disabilities. There were 390,000 new
occurrences of occupational disease each year, and $1.5 billion was being lost in
foregone wages. See SENATE Comm. ON LABOR AND PUBLC WELFARE, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
1, 1-2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5177-78, also
reprinted in Sunco,sL. ON LABOR, SENATE COiMs. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d CONG., IST SEss., LEGiSLATrVE IsToRY OF T=E OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 141, 141-42 (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter cited as
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
229 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976) as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-251, § 2(a) (7),
92 Stat. 183 (1978) (to be codified in 29 U.S.C. § 661) (see 29 U.S.C.A. § 661
(Supp. 1979)) (substituting hearing examiners for administrative law judges on
OSHRC).

8 See, e.g., Marshall v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 574 F.2d 119, 122
(2d Cir. 1978); 116 CoNG. REc. 42,201 (Conference Report on S. 2193, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, "Effect on Other Laws"), 38,367 (remarks
of Rep. Smith), 38,380 (remarks of Rep. Eshelman), 38,381 (remarks of Rep.
Hathaway), 42,208 (remarks of Rep. Scherle) (1970), reprinted in LEcIsLATrvE
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1204 (Conference Report), 979 (Rep. Smith), 1015
(Rep. Eshelman), 1018-19 (Rep. Hathaway), 1223 (Rep. Scherle).

429 U.S.C. §653(b)(1) (1976).
5The Occupational Safety and Health Act places responsibility for implementation of the Act upon the Department of Labor, which has established an Occupational Safety and Health Administration to take on these executive functions.
For purposes of convenience, this Comment will use the acronym "OSHA' to refer
to both the Act and the Administration, depending on context to make clear which
is intended.
029 U.S.C. §653(b)(1) (1976).
The relevant portions of §4(b)(1) read:
"Nothing in this [Act] shall apply to working conditions of employees with respect
to which other Federal agencies . . . exercise statutory authority to prescribe or
enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety or health."
7520 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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workers' organizations and an individual farmworker, sought to
compel the Secretary of Labor to issue a permanent farmworker
pesticide-exposure standard. But the court held that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) promulgation of regulations
protecting farmworkers from pesticide exposure, under the Federal
Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972 (FEPCA),s precluded
OSHA from issuing its own pesticide regulations. 9
This decision, the first judicial interpretation of OSHA's federal pre-emption 10 clause, has deprived farmworkers of effective
Moreover, OMICA's inprotection from pesticide hazards."
terpretation of section 4(b)(1), if applied to other industries,
threatens to have an adverse impact on the occupational safety
and health protection provided to nonagricultural workers as well.
In order to better understand the implications of the OMICA
decision, this Comment will provide in part I some background
information on farmworkers, pesticide hazards, and EPA and
OSHA regulations and enforcement powers. In part II, the Comment will examine, in the light of OSHA's broad purpose, the
problems created by pre-emption. The final three parts formulate
guidelines for interpreting section 4(b) (1), which will ensure that
this provision will not serve to deprive workers of comprehensive
12
occupational safety and health protection.
The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control
8 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1976).
Act revised the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), set
out at 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1976). FIFRA was further amended in 1978, by
the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, §§ 1-29, 92 Stat. 810
(1978) (to be codified in 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y). While the major thrust of these
amendments was revision of the pesticide registration process, another significant
modification was the express delegation of pesticide-use enforcement to the states.
See note 198 infra. See generally 44 Fed. Reg. 4352, 4354, 4359 (1979); Note,
Primary Enforcement Responsibility for Pesticide Use Violations Under the Federal
Pesticide Act of 1978, 55 IND. L.J. 139 (1979).
9OMICA v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1975). As a foundation for its decision that OSHA had been pre-empted, the OMICA court first
held that FEPCA conferred upon the EPA sufficient statutory authority to
issue pesticide regulations. Id. 1166. The court did not, however, address the
question whether OSHA and EPA could agree to mutual enforcement of EPA's
pesticide standards. Id. 1170 n.11.
I0Section 4(b)(1), OSHA's pre-emption clause, is somewhat unusual. See
note 6 supra for text. Although this clause is referred to throughout this Comment as OSHA's pre-emption clause, OSHA is the agency which is subject to
pre-emption by other agencies.
11 See text accompanying notes 28-58 infra.
12For other attempts to formulate principles or tests for § 4(b) (1) interpretation, see M. RoTnsTEin, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW § 19 (1978);
Cleary, Inter-agency Relationships under OSHA: A Brief Review of OSHRC Decisions, 29 LAB. L.J. 3 (1978); 1 EmPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) If516.
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I. BACKGROUND: FARMWORKERS AND
FEDERAL PESTICIDE REGULATION

There are over five million farmworkers in the United States. 13
Approximately 1.2 million 14 are considered "migrants," 15 at least
three quarters of whom are employed by conglomerates engaged
in agribusiness. 16 Farmworkers work in one of the most hazardous
of occupations, 17 facing a number of dangerous working conditions, 18 including exposure to pesticides. 19 The occupational death

rate for agriculture is higher than for all industries, except mining
and construction, 20 although it is unclear, given other deprivations,
exactly how much of this is due to work hazards. The most widelyquoted figures on pesticide-related disabilities, however, estimate
800 deaths and 80,000 injuries annually.2 1 It is known that chemicals used in agriculture account for five percent of all occupational

disease and for forty-five percent of all occupational poisonings. 22

13 In the Matter of an Effective Incident Reporting System, Petition to the
Environmental Protection Agency (April 1979) [hereinafter cited as EPA Petition],
(citing D. Lillesand, An Estimate of Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers in the
U.S. and Puerto Rico (Legal Services Corp.) (1977)). Other sources estimate the
number of farmworkers at between three and 3.5 million. See, e.g., N. AsH oRD,
CRIusis

IN THE WoRICILAcE:

OccurAIoNAL DISEASE

AM

INJUtY

521 (1976).

Lillesand appears to be the more accurate and recent source.
14 Statement of Charles Horwitz, Attorney for Migrant Legal Action Program,
Inc., to Conference on Pesticides and Human Health, Society for Occupational and
Environmental Health, in Washington, D.C. 3 (Dec. 13, 1978) [hereinafter cited
as Statement of Charles Horwitz].
15 Migrants are defined as "workers who cross county lines overnight to perform farm wage work with the expectation of eventually returning home." N.
AsHwonn, supra note 13, at 521 (quoting Hearings on Migrant and Seasonal
Farmworker Powerlessness Before the Subcomm. on Migratory Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 4,984 (1969)
(testimony of Raymond M. Wheeler) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]).
16 These agribusiness conglomerates include DelMonte, Stokely, Van Camp,
Green Giant, Birdseye, and Campbell Soup. Weissman, Pesticides, Farmworkers,
and OSHA, 27 REs fPsA LoQurro--Gzo. EVv.oF L. & PuB. InEsr
1 (1975).
17 Id.
1sThese conditions include the extreme safety hazard created by farm machinery. See N. ASHFoRD, supra note 13, at 525-26.
19 Farmworkers, working in fields sprayed with toxic chemicals, face the severe
dangers of chemical inhalation and skin exposure. Among the symptoms caused by
pesticides are skin sores, rashes, blurred vision, rapid heart beat, diarrhea, vomiting,
convulsions, respiratory failure, long-term nerve tissue damage, serious mental disorders, and death. Id. 523-25. See Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 132 n.19 (5th Cir. 1974); Weissman, supra note 16,
at 1.
20 N. AsHFonn, supra note 13, at 522.
21 See S. Br. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4, reprinted in [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & An. Nzws 5177, 5188, also reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 144; N. AsHmoRD, supra note 13, at 524.
22
Comment, Farmworkers in Jeopardy: OSHA, EPA, and the Pesticide Hazard,
5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69, 73 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Farmworkers in Jeopardy].
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Not surprisingly, farmworkers have a life expectancy significantly
shorter than the American population as a whole. 23 Obviously,
this has become a major public health problem deserving stringent
remedial steps.
Most worker-oriented legislation, however, has not protected
farmworkers from this serious and widespread health hazard.
Farmworkers are not covered by many state workmen's compensation laws. 24 In addition, the exclusion of farmworkers from
the National Labor Relations Act,m has made it extremely difficult for them to organize to protect their own health and safety.2
The Occupational Safety and Health Act, on the other hand, was
2-7
specifically intended to provide full coverage for farmworkers.
That goal, however, has not yet been realized. For one thing, as
a result of OMICA, the EPA now has federal jurisdiction over
farmworker pesticide protection. Unfortunately, EPA's effectiveness in the worker protection area has been limited, while OSHA
has refused to provide any additional protection. The upshot has
been a serious lack of adequate pesticide safeguards for farmworkers.
Some comparisons may help to illustrate the difference between EPA's relatively weak pesticide protection-in terms of
standard-setting and enforcement power-and the potentially strong
protection which OSHA could provide if not pre-empted. Compare, for instance, OSHA's primary absolute criterion for standards
controlling toxic substances-"the attainment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee" 28-with
23 Statement of Charles Horwitz, supra note 14, at 5 (farmworkers have a life
expectancy of 41 years compared with 70 years for the American population as a
whole); N. Asssonn, supra note 13, at 522 (farmworkers have a life expectancy
twenty years less than the average American; the migrant farmworker infant and
maternal mortality rate is 125% higher than the national average).
24 Only 28 states and Puerto Rico include agricultural workers under such laws.
Only 16 provide farmworker coverage as comprehensive as that provided to other
kinds of employees. N. AsHsonn, supra note 13, at 522.
2529 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
Section 152(3) excludes agricultural employees from the coverage of the NLRA.
26 Currently, only one percent of farmworkers are organized. N. AsHrouD,
supra note 13, at 522. Farmworkers do not have access to the National Labor
Relations Board representation machinery or to the protective unfair labor practices
provisions of Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1976); R. GoRmAN, BAsIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW 33 (1976).
27 N. AsiHFoR, supra note 13, at 522.
2829 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976) (emphasis added). But see Industrial Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petr. Inst., 48 U.S.L.W. 5022, 5031 (U.S. July 2,
1980), aff'g American Petr. Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), in which
the Supreme Court stated that § 655(b) (5)
was not designed to require employers to provide absolutely risk-free workplaces whenever it is technologically feasible to do so, so long as the cost
is not great enough to destroy an entire industry. Rather, . . . [the Act]
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EPA's balancing standard for judging pesticides-no "unreasonable
risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic,
social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any
pesticide." 29 Under EPA's mandate, important pesticide controls
may simply be "balanced away" when placed on the scales with
other "economic, social and environmental costs and benefits."
For example, EPA's pesticide regulations set re-entry times 30 for
twelve specified pesticides at lengths of either twenty-four or fortyeight hours.31 Otherwise, re-entry is prohibited to workers not
wearing protective clothing only "until sprays have dried or dusts
have settled." 32 The pesticide regulations originally issued by
OSHA, 33 by contrast, covered 21 pesticides and set all re-entry
periods at a minimum of two days and usually much longer.3 4
In addition, although the problems faced by indoor workers
differ from those confronting outdoor workers, a comparison of
EPA's regulation of fieldworker pesticide exposure and OSHA's
regulation of the manufacture of one pesticide-dibromochloropropane (DBCP)- reveals the inadequacy of the number 3 5 and
types of safeguards provided by EPA. OSHA requires employer
measurement of exact exposure levels to DBCP; 30 EPA allows no
was intended to require the elimination, as far as feasible, of significant
risks of harm.
297 U.S.C. § 136(bb)
(1976) (emphasis added). See Farmworkers in
Jeopardy, supra note 22, at 111 ("How is the slow impairment of a farmworker's
eye-hand coordination to be weighted economically and socially against an immediate increase in yield per acre").
3
o Re-entry period is defined as the period of time that must elapse after
spraying before workers can safely re-enter a sprayed field. N. AsmFoar, supra
note 13, at 523. See also Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of
Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 122 (5th Cir. 1974).
3140 C.F.R. § 170.3(b)(2) (1979).
321d. § (b) (1).
Section (b)(3) provides, however, that if special circumstances exist which
would reasonably lead to the conclusion that re-entry is unsafe, such re-entry is
prohibited.
8338 Fed. Reg. 10,715-17 (1973).
34The relative weakness of EPA's pesticide regulations is also demonstrated by
a comparison with the standards set by the State of California and with the
standards negotiated by the United Farm Workers (UFW). The standard UFW
contract, for example, requires a re-entry time of 21 days (five days if protective
clothing and respirators are worn) after a field is sprayed with the pesticide
parathion; the EPA regulations require two days. California's required re-entry
time for the pesticide guthion ranges from 14 to 30 days depending upon the
crop, while EPA's re-entry time is only one day. See Farmworkers in Jeopardy,
supra note 22, at 122-37. See generally id. 88-90; N. Asi-oRD, supra note 13, at 531.
35EPA farmworker pesticide protection regulations cover one page In the Code
of Federal Regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 170 (1979). OSHA's regulations governing
DCBP cover 11 pages. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1044, at 734-45 (1979).
36 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1044(f) (1979).
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re-entry "until sprays have dried or dusts have settled." 37 EPA
definies protective clothing as consisting of at least a hat, a longsleeved shirt, trousers, shoes and socks; 38 OSHA provides for
respirators, specialized protective clothing, specific eye and face
protections, and cleaning and replacement of all contaminated
clothing.3 9 OSHA provides for detailed medical surveillance; 40
EPA provides none. OSHA provides for employee information and
training; 41 EPA regulations require none.

OSHA provides a

specific warning sign for employees; 42 EPA requires written or
oral warnings. 43 OSHA requires detailed sampling of exposure
levels and general recordkeeping;"44 EPA requires neither.45
Beyond its comparatively weak standard-setting powers, EPA's
enforcement powers under FEPCA pale in comparison with OSHA's
enforcement apparatus. Whereas OSHA powers provide for direct
enforcement of its occupational-safety standards, EPA can enforce
its worker-protection regulations only indirectly, by applying penalties for failure to comply with directions on pesticide labels. 46
Furthermore, EPA's enforcement and inspection powers are not
directed toward the farm, but rather toward the pesticide manufacturer's workplace. 47 It is doubtful whether EPA even has the
C.F.R. § 170.3(b)(1) (1979).
Id. § 170.2(d).
3929 C.F.R. § 1910.1044(h), (j) (1979).
3740
38

40 Id. § 1910.1044(m).
411d. § 1910.1044(n).
421d. § 1910.1044(o).
43 40 C.F.R. § 170.5 (a) (1979).
4429 C.F.R. § 1910.1044(p) (1979).
45
Another instructive comparison is with OSHA agricultural standards for
exposure to cotton dust. In contrast to EPA's agricultural pesticide exposure regulations, the OSHA standards provide detailed protective clothing, medical surveillance, employee training, warning-sign and record-keeping requirements.
Id.
§ 1928.113 as amended, 43 Fed. Reg. 35,035 (1978).
467 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2) (1976).
See generally Farmworkers in Jeopardy,
supra note 22, at 114-20.
Indirect sanctions rarely provide adequate protection, however, because in
order to be effective they depend upon the label being read, comprehended, and
obeyed by the user. W. RocEs, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMNENTAL LAW § 8.5, at
868-69 (1977). Many farmworkers never see the pesticide label, and it is unlikely
in any case that Spanish-speaking farmworkers would be able to comprehend labels
written in English. Label-protection is, therefore, "unlikely to provide consistent
and firm deterrence." Comment, The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control
Act of 1972: A Compromise Approach, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 277, 303 (1973).
47FEPCA focuses on the registration and inspection of "establishments," meaning any place where a pesticide "is produced, or held, for distribution or sale."
7 U.S.C. § 136(dd) (1976).
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statutory authority to inspect the user's workplace. 48 OSHA, on
49
the other hand, has the authority to make surprise inspections
and has generally superior inspection procedures.5 0 OSHA can
subpoena witnesses and evidence il and can issue citations which
can result in heavy fines, if the cited working condition is not
2
changed.
OSHA also confers upon employees a number of unique enforcement rights.53 These include the employees' right to initiate
an investigation by filing a complaint 5 4 the right to have a representative accompany OSHA inspectors at the workplaceD5 the right
to bring an action to compel inspections,5 the right to protection
against retaliatory action for making an OSHA complaint,57 and
the right to refuse to perform imminently hazardous work.58
The preceding discussion and examples should make clear
the serious health problems faced by farmworkers, the shortcomings
of EPA's pesticide regulations, and OSHA's ability to combine
comprehensive pesticide controls with strong enforcement powers.
The full implications of the OMICA decision, and the problems
which that decision has spawned for the protection of farmworkers,
are best perceived, however, in light of OSHA's broader goals and
48FIFRA gives EPA explicit authority to enter and inspect producer establishments, 7 U.S.C. § 136g, while it omits any specific authority to enter and inspect
workplaces where pesticides are used. Although it can be argued that EPA could
use its warrant power, 7 U.S.C. § 136g(b), to enter farm workplaces in order to
effectuate the purposes of the Act, EPA has never attempted to exercise this
authority. Because of this lack of specific statutory authority, EPA conducts no
regular inspections of the farm workplace. If investigation of a complaint of
pesticide poisoning requires inspection, the farm owner's permission is requested.
If the owner refuses, EPA does nothing. Conversation with John Ulfedler, EPA's
Office of Enforcement (April 3, 1980).
In addition, because EPA's program of enforcement is directed at the applicator of pesticides-through certification requirements, 7 U.S.C. § 136b--it almost
never would assess penalties directly against the farm owner; especially on
agribusiness farms, the owner and applicator are rarely the same person. Conversation with staff member, EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs (February 20,
1980).
49 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976).
50 Cf. Puget Sound Tug & Barge, [1978] OSHD 122,635, at 27,312 (1978)
(OSHA inspections compared with Coast Guard inspections).
5129 U.S.C. § 657(b) (1976).
52 Id. § 666.
53
See generally M. RoTsTEYN, supra note 12, at §§ 181-88.
5429 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1976).
55 Id. § 657(e).
56 Id. § 657(f).
57Id.§ 660(c) (1).
58
See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 100 S. Ct. 883 (1980) (unanimous decision upholding OSHA regulation providing protection against employer retaliation
for maintenance employees who refused to work on wire mesh netting from which
another employee had recently fallen to his death).
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the public policy behind the Act. The next part of this Comment
will be devoted to these issues.
II. OSHA's BROAD PURPOSE
It is an established principle of statutory construction that
exemptions from remedial,59 labor, 60 and safety 1' legislation should
be narrowly construed. 2 OSHA's fundamental objective is the
prevention of occupational deaths and injuries.6 3 This goal is evidenced by OSHA's legislative history 64 and by its stated purpose of
assuring "so far as possible every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working conditions and . . . [of preserving] our human resources." 0 Obviously, this congressional purpose is best served by a narrow construction of exemptions from
OSHA's coverage.
59
See 3 J. SUTHERLAND, SrATuTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.01
(4th ed. 1973). Cf. United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969)
(remedial legislation to be liberally construed).
Remedial statutes are defined as those which "afford a remedy, or improve
[or are] intended for the correction of defects."
* . . remedies already existing . ..
3 J. SUTHERLAND, supra, at § 60.02, at 31.
6
6Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968)
("We have cautioned against a literal reading of congressional labor legislation;
. . . its proper construction frequently requires consideration of its wording against
the background of its legislative history and in the light of the general objectives
Congress sought to achieve.").
01Cf. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 100 S. Ct. 883 (1980) (safety legislation
to be liberally construed); Lilly v. Grand Trunk W.R.R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 486
(1943) (safety legislation to be liberally construed).
62 When a narrow construction is given to a statutory exemption, a liberal
construction is being given to the statute as a whole, because such a construction
gives the statute wider applicability. 3 J. StrrrnLAND, supra note 59, at § 60.01.
63 See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 100 S. Ct. 883, 888-89 (1980).
64

The Senate report on OSHA states that "[tjhe problem of assuring safe and
healthful workplaces for our working men and women ranks in importance with
any that engages the national attention today." SENATE Comm. ON LABOR AN
PUB. WELARE, OccUPATiONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, S. BRE. No.
1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5177, 5177-78, also reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 142.
See note 1 supra, for additional legislative history. See also 116 CoNe. REc. 37,628

(remarks of Sen. Nelson), 37,628, 37,630 (remarks of Sen. Cranston), 42,203
(remarks of Rep. Daniels)

(1970),

reprinted in LEGISLATIvE

IsTORY,

supra

note 1, at 516-18 (Sen. Nelson), 518-22 (Sen. Cranston), 1001 (Rep. Daniels).
65 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976) (emphasis added); see also RMI Co. v. Secretary
of Labor, 594 F.2d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 1979); American Petr. Inst. v. OSHA, 581
F.2d 493, 509 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Industrial Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petr. Inst., 48 U.S.L.W. 5022 (U.S. July 2, 1980);
Beatty Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 577 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir.
1978).
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Most decisions 66 construing section 4(b)(1) have interpreted
OSHA "'liberally in favor of the workers whom it was designed to
protect, and any exemption from its terms [has been] construed
These decisions have considered OSHA's fundanarrowly.' "67
mental purpose paramount, by interpreting section 4(b)(1) so as "to
complement [OSHA's] remedial scheme." 68 Contrary to most decisions interpreting OSHA, in OMICA v. Brennan, 9 the District
of Columbia Circuit incorrectly 70 decided that section 4 (b)(1) was
clear on its face and refused to consider OSHA's broad purpose. 71
Instead, the court relied upon congressional efforts to avoid "wasteful duplication" of regulatory activities in holding that EPA's regulations took precedence over earlier regulations promulgated by
OSHA.

72

This Comment, however, maintains that, if section 4(b)(1) is to
be consistent with the rest of OSHA, 73 some duplication of federal
regulation may have to be tolerated in order to achieve comprehensive results. Of course, as much as is possible should be done
to avoid redundancy, but surely Congress would not require
workers to sacrifice health and safety protection merely in order to
avoid procedural duplication. OSHA's remedial purpose is, and
should remain, paramount. Only those regulations which afford
66See Southern By. Co. v. OSH C, 539 F.2d 335, 338 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976). Cf. Marshall v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 574
F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1978) (an exemption should not be based on hypothetical
conflicts); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 390-99 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977) (OSHA's broad purpose means its substantive standards should not be replaced by the limited regulations of another
agency).
67
Southern By. Co. v. OSHRC, 539 F.2d 335, 338 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 999 (1976) (quoting Wirtz v. TiTi Peat Humus Co., 373 F.2d 209, 212
(4th Cir. 1967)).
65 Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 100 S. Ct. 883, 891 (1980).
69 520 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
70
See Marshall v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 574 F.2d 119, 122 (2d
Cir. 1978) ("The exact standard to be applied in determining the scope of preemption . . . is less than crystal clear"); M. RoTrSTEw, supra note 12, § 3, at
8 (1978) ("Various sections of the Act are vague, redundant, and even paradoxical.").
For a discussion of the variety of interpretations which can be given to
section 4(b) (1)'s phrases "working conditions," "exercise statutory authority," and
"affecting occupational safety or health," see text accompanying notes 77-206 infra.
71520 F.2d 1161, 1166-67 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
72 Id. 1167.
73 OSHA's broad legislative purpose, strong enforcement powers, and the inclusion of a general duty clause within OSHA recognizing an employer's duty to
"furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which
are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees," 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1) (1976), are all
indicative of OSHA's broad remedial purpose.
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beneficial results at least equivalent to those provided by OSHA
should actually pre-empt the Department of Labor's efforts. But in
cases that involve some overlap of apparent jurisdiction, without
equally stringent worker protection, OSHA should prevail. The
goal of preventing wasteful duplication means that duplication per
se may be necessary in certain contexts, so long as it is not wasteful.
While there may be room to differ over what is considered "wasteful," it is certainly not a waste of resources to achieve OSHA's goals.
In addition, abandonment of OSHA's regulations, in favor of
another agency's, would waste the efforts undertaken by the Department of Labor in the first place to promulgate and enforce its preempted standards. Clearly, unless the new regulations are more
effective than OSHA's, premitting wholesale pre-emption of
OSHA would simply encourage the kind of wasteful duplication
which the OMICA court professed to abhor. It would be a more
efficient use of governmental resources to require either an explicit
congressional intent to pre-empt 7 or more stringent regulations
before pre-emption is found to occur.
Substituting the regulations of an agency whose primary objective is not occupational safety and health for OSHA's protections
will almost always result in less protection for employees. 75 This
would undermine the congressional goal of providing maximum
protection to workers. 7 Furthermore, pre-emption decisions should
be aimed primarily at maximizing occupational safety and health
and secondarily at minimizing duplicative regulation. Unfortunately, a liberal interpretation of section 4(b)(1) would allow preemption to occur without consideration of either of these factors.
For example, the pre-empting agency may be motivated solely by a
desire to expand its jurisdiction. More ominous is the possibility
that another agency will issue pre-empting regulations only because
that agency has been "captured" by private interests that wish to
thwart OSHA's efforts. A narrow construction of section 4 (b)(1)
may prevent such occurrences.
Finally, aside from defeating Congress's expressed purpose in
enacting OSHA, a failure to narrowly construe section 4(b)(1) raises
several other problems. First, pre-emption creates practical problems for employers and employees with respect to whom OSHA
regulations already exist. Employers accustomed to particular
recordkeeping requirements and design specifications, for example,
74 See text following note 87 infra.
75
76

See notes 28-58 supra & accompanying text.
See note 28 supra & accompanying text.
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may face costly shifts in complying with the different requirements
of another agency. Employees accustomed to a certain set of rights
and duties under OSHA may likewise be subject to confusing new
procedures (or lack of procedures) under another agency's regulations. Employees entitled under OSHA to medical monitoring of
their exposure to toxic substances may, for example, lose their right
to continued monitoring.
This part has discussed OSHA's broad remedial goals with the
purpose of illustrating some of the serious problems presented by
the OMICA court's finding that EPA had pre-empted the Department of Labor. In order to fully understand under what conditions
the EPA and other federal agencies might be able to "oust" OSHA
worker protections in the future, the next part will examine the
various pre-emption "tests" that have been developed to guide
section 4(b)(1) decisions.
III.

THE FIRST TEST: "AFFECTING OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH"

The broadest possible interpretation of the section 4(b)(1)
phrases "exercise statutory authority" and "regulations affecting
occupational safety and health" 77 would permit almost automatic
pre-emption of OSHA. Although this language in section 4(b)(1)
might be interpreted to mean that any agency merely possessing
statutory authority to promulgate regulations only tangentially affecting occupational health and safety would pre-empt OSHA, the
courts and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
(OSHR ) have generally rejected this interpretation. 78 The favored
interpretation is a much narrower one which preserves OSHA's
goal of broad and effective worker protection.7 9 The following
discussion will attempt to resolve the issue of when a potentially
pre-empting agency's regulations "affect" occupational safety and
health.
A. Distinguishing Between Incidental and Direct Effects
of Regulation
One analytic approach, used by the courts and the OSHRG to
determine if a regulation "affects" occupational safety and health,
has been to distinguish between regulations which have incidental
and direct effects. For example, Department of Agriculture regu77 See note 6 supra, for text of § 4(b) (1).

78

See notes 80-83 infra & accompanying text.
79 See notes 1, 2 and 63-65 supra & accompanying text.
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lations designed to protect consumers by requiring railings preventing processed meat from coming into contact with workers may
provide incidental occupational safety protection. In some sense,
therefore, these regulations do "affect occupational safety and
health." However, such regulations were held not to pre-empt
OSHA regulations aimed directly at occupational safety, which require guardrails on both sides of the stairways in dressing-floor
areas.8 0
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) requirements
for labeling of benzene containers provide another example of
regulations indirectly affecting the occupational health of employees.81 In American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 2 it was
argued that these CPSC standards pre-empted OSHA's authority to
similarly require the labeling of products containing benzene. The
Fifth Circuit, however, concluded that the CPSC's regulations had
not been "designed to protect a class of workers and ...

directed

at the working conditions of employees" and did not, therefore,
pre-empt OSHA.83
In contrast with regulations which ostensibly do not deal with
occupational safety, the relevant EPA pesticide regulations are
clearly directed at worker hazards. Their title, "Worker Protection
Standards for Agricultural Pesticides," 84 reveals that they are intended to offer more than incidental occupational safety and health
protection. However, it does not follow that EPA pesticide regulations pre-empt OSHA. OSHRC decisions have required more than
a finding that regulations provide direct worker protection in order
for pre-emption to occur. In Gearhart-Owen Industries, Inc.,s5
OSHRC ruled that Department of Defense regulations requiring
extensive safety surveillance of contractors who manufacture ammunition and explosives did not pre-empt OSHA. And, in Luhr
Brothers Inc.,s6 Army Corps of Engineers regulations specifying
employee ear protection above certain sound levels also did not preempt OSHA. In Gearhart-Owen, OSHRC stated:
8

0 Sigman Meat Co., 8 0.S.A.H.R.C. 216, [1973-74] OSHD 1f17,783 (1974).
8116 C.F.R. § 1500.14(a)(3) (1979).

82581 F.2d 493, 508-10 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.,
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petr. Inst, 48 U.S.L.W. 5022 (U.S.
July 2, 1980).
83 Id. 510.
8440 C.F.R. § 170 (1979).
85 [1974-75] OSHD ff 19,329 (1975).
86 O.S.A.H.R.C. No. 77-16056 (Microfiche No. 77/185/Cl), [1977-78] OSHD
22,256 (1977).
11
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[A]nalysis of the applicability of section 4(b)(1) to a given
situation does not terminate upon a finding that the agency
in question . . . prescribes or enforces standards or regulations that affect occupational safety and health. Further
examination is required. The Congressionalpurpose . . .
must be examined to determine whether this statutory
purpose, supporting an agency's action, is to assure safe
and healthful working conditions for the benefit of
7
employees
B. The Key Factor: Statutory Purpose
Decisions interpreting section 4(b)(1) have looked to the statutory authority under which regulations challenging OSHA are promulgated in order to determine whether that authority is sufficient
to trigger pre-emption. Underlying this inquiry is an assumption
that, absent a clear legislative mandate to protect occupational
safety and health, an agency will not have the capacity to issue regulations which would be effective substitutes for OSHA protections.
Three alternative tests for determining whether non-OSHA
regulation triggers section 4(b)(1) pre-emption can be articulated:
(1) pre-emption will occur only when the sole purpose of the legislation is occupational safety and health; (2) pre-emption will occur
when one of the purposes of the legislation is occupational safety
and health; or (3) pre-emption will occur whenever employees are
merely within the class of persons who benefit from the statute. It
is here advocated that legislation meeting the first test almost always lead to section 4(b)(1) pre-emption, that legislation meeting the
second test usually 8 lead to pre-emption, and that legislation meeting only the third test rarely, if ever, pre-empt OSHA.
The Mine Safety and Health Act (MSHA) s9 is the best example of legislation meeting the first test. The Act's very name
implies what Congress had in mind-a specialized piece of legislation which was clearly intended to protect employees within a particular industry. Two examples of legislation meeting the second
test are the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA),90 and the
87[

1974-75] OSHD If 19,329, at 23,114 (1975)

(emphasis added).

That is, pre-emption would occur provided that the legislation is explicit in
covering occupational safety.
The legislative history of the 1977
8929 U.S.C. § 557(a) (Supp. II 1978).
enactment makes clear that "the need to provide for the health and safety of the
nation's miners" was the dominant force behind the act. S. Ri. No. 181, 95th
88

Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWs 3401-84; H.R.
REP. No. 655, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., -reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Nmws 3485-516.
9045 U.S.C.A. §§ 421-441 (1972 & Supp. 1979) (as amended).
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Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978
(OCSLA).91 Congress included within the Railway Safety Act, which
was primarily aimed at ensuring the safety of the general public,
some specific employee-safety provisions. 92 With respect to OCSLA,
Congress indicated in the statute that one of its purposes was to
regulate previously unregulated 93 hazardous working conditions.9 4
In OMICA, the court of appeals rejected the first test,
claimed it was applying the second test, 95 but in fact -applied the
third. In concluding that OSHA had been pre-empted by EPA,
the court relied on language in the Federal Environmental Pestithat the Act was designed to protect
cide Control Act, which stated
"man or the environment," 9 6 and on FEPCA's legislative history,
which indicated that farmworkers were within the class of persons
protected by the Act.9 7

FEPCA's language and legislative history

did not, however, indicate that a purpose of the act was occupational safety and health.
A more principled approach to such legislation, covering employees merely as members of a generally protected class, is illustrated by Luhr Brothers, Inc.98 In that case, OSHRC ruled that
the Army Corps of Engineers' legislative authority to "protect
people and property endangered by floods" included employees not
as employees, but rather as "individual members of a class composed of the general public." 99 This was also the reasoning of the
Commission in Fineberg Packing Co., 10 0 where it was held that
Agriculture Department authority pursuant to the Wholesome
Meat Act,101 over health conditions in the meat industry did not
pre-empt OSHA, because consumers-not employees-were the protected class. The OMICA court, however, distinguished the Whole9143 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (Supp. II 1978).
92

See 45 U.S.C.A. §§431(a), 431(g) (1972 & Supp. 1979) (as amended)

(empowering the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe and issue rules for all

areas of railroad safety); id. § 437(d) (Supp. 1979) (giving these safety rules the
same effect as statutes).
9

aSee text accompanying notes 118-20 infra (discussing OCSLA's language

and OSHA preemption).
94 See 43 U.S.C. § 1347(c) (Supp. II 1978) (regulations applying to unregulated hazardous working conditions).
95520 F.2d 1161, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
961d. 1165 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1976)).
97520 F.2d 1161, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
See text accompanying notes

126-29 infra.
98O.S.A.H.R.C. No. 77-16056 (Microfiche No. 77/185/Cl), [1977-78] OSHD
22,256 (1977).
99 Id., slip op. at 10, [1977-78] OSHD 1 22,256, at 26,790.
1007 O.S.A.H.R.C. 405, [1973-74] OSHD 117,518 (1974).
10121 U.S.C. §§ 601-680 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (as amended).
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some Meat Act from FEPCA on the ground that the former did
not purport to include employees within the class of persons protected, while FEPCA had such a purpose. 02 Even conceding
this distinction, however, FEPCA still provides less satisfactory
protection than that provided by legislation, such as MSHA,
OCSLA and FRSA, which on its face protects employees in the
workplace. By contrast, any protection which FEPCA might provide to farmworkers is incidental. The Act itself makes no mention
of farmworkers, while the only suggestion that they are covered
appears in the legislative history. Even that legislative history
does not consider farmworkers special objects of the Act, but instead lumps farmworkers together with their employers. 0 3
As the authorities have found, an agency which has not been
given explicit statutory authority to protect workers from poor
working conditions is not an effective substitute for OSHA. Rather,
employee welfare is maximized when OSHA is given as wide a
jurisdiction as possible. Therefore, a broad statute, which merely
places employees within a general class which the statute is designed
to protect, should not be found to pre-empt OSHA and undermine
its broad purpose of maximizing employee protections. Pre-emption should be based upon a clear statutory purpose to provide
adequate alternative safeguards and not upon slender jurisdictional
arguments.
C. The Effect of Future Legislation
1. Should Express Intent to Pre-empt Be Required?
Section 4(b)(1) pre-emption can occur as a result of regulations
promulgated pursuant to legislation existing before OSHA was enacted or, as occurred in OMICA, pursuant to legislation adopted
after OSHA's enactment in 1970. Obviously, in the case of prior
legislation, Congress would have had no thoughts regarding the
pre-emption of OSHA. Thus, section 4(b)(1) analysis of statutes,
such as the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967 104 and the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,105 must rely exclusively on the statutory purpose
test. 00 In enacting statutes subsequent to OSHA, however, Congress could, of course, express its intentions about pre-emption.
The difficulty comes in the face of congressional silence.
F.2d 1161, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
See notes 126-29 infra & accompanying text.
10421 U.S.C. §§ 601-680 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (as amended).
1o549 U.S.C.A. §§ 1421-1541 (1976 & Supp. 1979) (as amended).
LO6 See text accompanying notes 77-103 supra.
102 520
103
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Such congressional reticence may be interpreted one of three
ways. First, absent a clearly expressed intent to pre-empt, in either
the statute or legislative history, the presumption would always run
against pre-emption. This approach would ensure that OSHA's
remedial purpose would not be thwarted inadvertently. The opposite approach, with the presumption in favor of pre-emption in
the absence of express legislative intent, would lead to the
anomalous result that congressional silence outweighs articulated
OSHA protections. The third approach would be to return to the
statutory purpose test 107 for legislation enacted subsequent to
OSHA.
The legislative history of section 4(b)(1) provides some assistance in ascertaining the effect on OSHA of subsequent legislation. An interchange, 108 excerpted below, between Representatives
Erlenborn and Daniels is instructive of what Congress intended' 09
the section to accomplish:
Mr. Erlenborn. There is one other situation where there
is no present statutory authority, but subsequent to this
bill becoming law, statutory authority is enacted, and then
the exercise of that authority comes into play: Would
that then exempt an industry?
Mr. Daniels of New Jersey. I think it would depend upon
the language employed in that future statute as to what
was the intent of Congress. Would it be the intent of
Congress that that particular industry should be exempt
from the provisions of this bill, or shall we place all safety
standards under one authority; namely, as provided in
this particular bill?
Mr. Erlenborn. I would suspect that if there were separate authority enacted in the future, it would be clearly
the intent of Congress that that separate authority would
apply rather than the present authority, else legislative
enactment would be a waste of time.
Mr. Daniels of New Jersey. I would say it would depend
upon the intent of Congress at that particular moment."10
107 Id.
108 Most of the other legislative history only parroted the wording of § 4(b) (1).
See, e.g., 116 CoNG. REc. 35,727 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIE HISToRY,
supra note 1, at 308 (comparative analysis of S. 2193 and S. 4404).
109 Id. at 38,381-82, reprinted in LEGISLATivE I.ISTORY, supra note 1, at

1018-20.
110 Id. at 38,382, reprinted in LEGiSLA vE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1020.
The wording of §4(b)(1), at the time of this colloquy, was that it exempted
"working conditions of employees with respect to whom any Federal agency . ..
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Because Daniels was one of the sponsors of OSHA,"' courts
should follow his comments and require a showing of legislative
intent before finding that OSHA is pre-empted." 2 Congress
would thereby be encouraged to make as clear as possible its intent
regarding pre-emption by subsequent legislation. Furthermore,
this would prevent OSHA's broad protections against hazardous
working conditions from being inadvertently pre-empted by less
effective regulation.
For example, some statutes enacted after OSHA have clearly
stated whether they were intended to pre-empt OSHA. The Toxic
Substances Control Act' 13 empowers EPA to regulate the manufacture, distribution, use, and disposal of hazardous chemical substances." 4 EPA's statutory authority to issue worker protection
regulations for hazardous substances would, under the OMICA
court's view, pre-empt OSHA regulations.1 5 But, in this case,
Congress recognized the potential for an OMICA-type situation and
specifically stated its intent not to pre-empt OSHA." 6 That provision was added to the general statutory provisions which detailed
the interaction between the EPA and all other federal agencies
(including OSHA) with overlapping jurisdiction. 1 7 In the regulation of toxic substances, then, Congress has provided the evidence of intention that Congressman Daniels thought necessary
to determine whether post-OSHA legislation pre-empts OSHA's
jurisdiction over occupational safety and health conditions.
To a somewhat lesser degree, the language of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1978 "1s indicates that Congress also
did not intend to pre-empt OSHA's jurisdiction over workers on
the outer continental shelf. That statute gives the Coast Guard
authority over "unregulated hazardous working conditions related
exercise[s] statutory authority."

For current wording of §4(b)(1), see note 6

supra.
supra note 12, at § 3.
l See M. RoTmsxrS,
112 See 2A J. SummEnI.zm, supra note 59, at § 48.15.
"13 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976).
14 Pesticides are specifically excluded, because they are covered under FIFBA.
Id. §2602(2)(B)(ii).
115OSHA's current toxic and hazardous substances regulations are found at
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000-.1500 & 1928.113 (1979).
11615 U.S.C. §2608(c) (1979) specifically states that §4(b)(1) conditions

are not met by the Toxic Substances Control Act: "In exercising any authority
under this chapter, the Administrator shall not, for purposes of section 653(b)(1)

of title 29, be deemed to be exercising statutory authority to prescribe or enforce
standards or regulations affecting occupational safety and health."
1715 U.S.C. § 2608(a) (1976).
11843 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (Supp. II 1978).
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to activities on the outer Continental Shelf" 119 and states that
"[n]othing in this subchapter shall affect the authority provided by
law to the Secretary of Labor for the protection of occupational

safety and health."

120

The language of these statutes thus supports the view that when
Congress actually considers what effect a new statute should have on
OSHA, it makes its intent on the issue relatively clear. Congress
will, therefore, rarely pre-empt by subsequent, specialized legislation
OSHA's protection of employees without making that purpose explicit.12 1 In any case, judicial refusal to find pre-emption absent a
clear showing of legislative intent would encourage Congress to
make its enactments less ambiguous.
2. The Intent Behind FEPCA
With respect to OSHA's protection of farmworkers from pesticides, it is important to note the following statement in the Senate
Committee report on the Act: "Pesticides . . . have increasingly
become recognized as a particular source of hazard . . . . Despite
the unmistakable danger that these substances present, no effective
controls presently exist over their safe use and no effective protections against toxic exposure of farmworkers or others in the rural
populace [sic]." 122
This passage demonstrates that pesticide protection for farmworkers fell within OSHA's ambit, as originally adopted. Although
the FEPCA's 1972 amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungiside, and Rodenticide Act '12 3 may arguably have established pesticide
24
protections which were lacking at the time of OSHA's adoption,
119Id. § 1347(c) (emphasis added).
120Id. §1347(d). See generally H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
157-58 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1563-64.
Despite these provisions, the district court in Marshall v. Pool Offshore Co.
indicated, in dictum, that OCSLA may pre-empt OSHA. The court noted that the
Coast Guard had recently published regulations applying to mobile offshore drilling
units and that such regulations seemed sufficient to activate §4(b)(1) preemption. 467 F. Supp. 978, 982-83 (W.D. La. 1979).
121 While

it could be argued that the inclusion of statutory language on this

issue in the Toxic Substances Act and OCSLA is an indication that Congress could

have done the same to prevent pre-emption under FEPCA, such an argument

overlooks the fact that Congress simply never considered the effect on OSHA of

the 1972 FEPCA Amendments to FIFRA. See note 129 supra.
nREP.
No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1970), reprinted in [1970]
122S.

U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 5177, 5179-80, also reprinted in LEGIsrATvE
IsToRY, supra note 1, at 141, 143-44.

U.S.C. §§ 136-136k (Supp. IV 1974) (since amended).
was Judge Tamm's characterization in OMICA of FEPCA controls.
520 F.2d 1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1975). It should be noted that subsequent
amendments to FIFRA in 1975 and 1978 have generally weakened EPA controls
1237

124 This
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this Comment has suggested 12 that express FEPCA intent to provide such protection be required in order to pre-empt OSHA's
jurisdiction. Expression of intent is especially important with respect to consumer- and environmental-protection statutes, such as
FEPCA, because Congress is unlikely to be thinking about occupational safety when the statute does not deal with employment problems. Only explicit indications of intent to cover labor can prevent
inadvertent or improvident pre-emption of OSHA's measures.
The OMICA court, nevertheless, argued that under the Daniels
view, that a definite legislative intent must be discerned before
newer legislation could pre-empt OSHA, the FEPCA amendments
of 1972 contained the requisite legislative intent.126 Judge Tamm
based this conclusion on the fact that, in rejecting a provision which
would have specifically protected farmworkers, the House Agriculture Committee had indicated that it considered the provision surplusage, because farmers and farmworkers were obviously objects of
the bill's protection.'2 7 Such statements in the legislative history
should not, however, carry the dispositive weight that Judge Tamm
attributed to them.128 Congress simply did not demonstrate a clear
intent to cover farmworker pesticide hazards and to preclude OSHA
from developing its own standards to protect farmworkers. OSHA's
protections and the effect that FEPCA would have on them were
29
never mentioned.
The courts should take an approach different from that taken
by the OMICA court. Absent a clear intent to pre-empt, the presumption should run against pre-emption of OSHA's unique protections. Such a presumption would help ensure that regulation
which does pre-empt OSHA will in practice provide effective worker
protection.
over pesticides.

See text following note 48 supra and note 198 infra & accom-

panying text.
125 See text following note 110 supra.
120 520 F.2d 1161, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
127

Id.1169.

128

For the dangers of giving undue weight to legislative history in general
statutory construction, see generally F. DicmmsoN, THE INrEnpRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STAtXrES 162-64 (1975); 2A J. SuTHERaND, supra note 59, at
§ 48.01-.10.
129 There is no mention of OSHA in FEPCA's legislative history, see [1972]
U.S. CoDE CoNc. & AD. NEws 3993, nor was it mentioned in the 1975 or 1978
amendments.
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IV. THE SECOND TEST: THE SCOPE OF
"WORKING

CONDrnIONS"

Assuming that pre-emption is authorized under the first preemption test requiring express intent or statutory purpose, 130 the
scope of that pre-emption must be determined. The question is
whether, and to what extent, OSHA may still regulate "working
conditions" within an industry when another federal agency also
has authority to regulate occupational safety and health in that
industry. Obviously, the narrower the scope of pre-emption, the
broader OSHA's jurisdiction remains. Furthermore, the less dear
an intent to pre-empt appears, the more strictly construed should
be the scope of that pre-emption. Otherwise, slight indications of
intent could be given disproportionate effect. This is a particularly
pertinent problem in the pesticide hazard area, given the OMICA
court's disposition of the pre-emption issue.
Before proceeding to discuss the scope of EPA's pre-emption
of OSHA in OMICA's aftermath, the authorities interpreting this
"working conditions" language of section 4(b)(1) should be exam-

ined.131 There are three possible definitions of this language: (1)
the entire employment relationship (substitute the word "industries"
for "working conditions"); (2) the general territorial area or surrounding within a particular industry (substitute "categories of
working conditions"); and (3) the discrete and particular hazards
within a general category of working conditions (substitute "particular hazards").
A. The Industry-Wide Exemption Rejected
The first interpretation, sometimes referred to as the "industrywide" exemption, has been squarely rejected in two major circuit
court decisions interpreting section 4(b)(1). 3 2 In Southern Railway
Co. v. OSHRC, a3 and in Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v.
Usery,134 the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, respectively, held that the

Federal Railway Administration's (FRA) regulations for railway
operating equipment and accident-reporting requirements did not
preclude OSHA from citing the railroads involved for violating
OSHA regulations regarding railroad repair facilities. Although
13o See

notes 88-129 & accompanying text.
131 For language of § 4(b)(1), see note 6 supra.
32
1 See also Marshall v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 574 F.2d 119, 122

(2d Cir. 1978) (airline industry); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. OSHRC, 548 F.2d 1052,
1053-54 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
133 539 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).
134 539 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
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the Fourth Circuit in Southern Railway found nothing definitive in
the legislative history on the interpretation of "working conditions," 1'3the Fifth Circuit did find support in the legislative history
for its conclusion that an industry-wide exemption was not intended.1, Both courts relied heavily on the general principle that
37
OSHA's purpose necessitates a broad interpretation of its coverage.
These decisions were cognizant of the potential damage to
worker protection under an industry-wide exemption. Merely by
regulating one aspect of railroad safety, such as recordkeeping,
engine noise, or locomotive operations, the FRA would have been
able to negate OSHA regulations of all other hazards within the
industry. 3 8 This result would be harmful to workers employed in
a field in which one agency exercises industry-wide jurisdiction. In
addition, an industry-wide exemption could lead to potentially disastrous results, when the pre-empting agency's jurisdiction covers
particular hazards rather than particular industries. For example,
if section 4(b)(1) requires industry-wide pre-emption, EPA's regulation of agricultural-worker standards for pesticides could pre-empt
OSHA from issuing standards for other agricultural hazards having
nothing to do with EPA's concerns, despite the absence of duplication. 138
B. Conditions or Hazards Actually Regulated
Having rejected an industry-wide interpretation of "working
conditions," the Southern Pacific and Southern Railway courts still
needed to define the statutory language. Both courts turned to
the definition of "working conditions" in Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan. 40 In Corning, a case arising under the Equal Pay Act
'35 539 F.2d 335, 337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).
136539 F.2d 386, 390-91 (5th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
One part of the support which the Fifth Circuit found was that the Senate version

of §4(b)(1) had used the phrase "particular working conditions," not "working
conditions." Id. 391 n.7.
13 7 See id. 391; Marshall v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 574 F.2d 119, 122

(2d Cir. 1978); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. OSHRC, 548 F.2d 1052, 1054 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Southern By. v. OSHRC, 539 F.2d 335, 338 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 999 (1976).
1 38
See Southern By. v. OSHC, 539 F.2d 335, 338 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 999 (1976); Southern Pac. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
139For other OSHA regulations for agricultural hazards, see 29 C.F.R.
Areas regulated include machinery, temporary labor camps,
§ 1928.1-.113 (1979).
and logging operations. Another example, recognized in Southern Pacific, was that,
with an industry-wide exemption, an accident-reporting requirement could replace
standards designed to prevent accidents.
140 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
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of 1963, the Supreme Court defined "working conditions" as "surroundings" 141 and "physical hazards." 142 However, the Southern
Railway and Southern Pacific courts could not agree whether, in
an OSHA context,143 working conditions should comprise surroundings, hazards, or both.
The Southern Railway court defined working conditions as
"the environmental area in which an employee customarily goes
about his daily tasks." 144 This general definition of "working
conditions" limits the areas in which OSHA can regulate. For
example, if FRA regulated any aspect of locomotive operations,
then OSHA could not regulate within that area at all. However,
according to Southern Railway, OSHA would not be pre-empted
from regulating railroad repair facilities which comprise a category
of conditions totally separate from locomotive operations. 14 5
The Fifth Circuit in Southern Pacific took a view that was
much more consistent with OSHA's goal of providing maximum
protection to all workers. That court held that OSHA was preempted from regulating only general categories, which the FRA
had regulated in a comprehensive14 6 manner, and discrete FRAregulated hazards. 147 For example, if the FRA issued comprehensive
regulations in the area of fire protection (a category of working
conditions), then OSHA would be pre-empted from issuing any
fire protection regulations. On the other hand, if the FRA adopted
a regulation involving only fire alarm systems (a discrete hazard),
OSHA could still enforce its own regulations concerning fire extinguishers (another discrete hazard within the same category of
working conditions). 14
The better tailored Southern Pacific definition of "working
conditions" fits more closely with the purpose of OSHA than does
141 "[E]lements such as toide chemicals or fumes, regularly encountered by a

worker, their intensity, and their frequency." Id. 202.
142"[T]he physical hazards regularly encountered, their frequency, and the
severity of injury they can cause." Id.
14 The definition of working conditions in Corning Glass Works is not really
applicable to OSHA. It was intended to define what aspects of the employment
relationship could be included within the boundaries of "working conditions"specifically, whether the time of day worked was a working condition. In contrast,
the question under § 4(b) (1) is whether the term "working conditions" necessarily

implies broad categories of employment or discrete hazards.
144539 F.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).
145 Id. 338-39.
146 Under Southern Pacific, "comprehensive" Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) regulations need not include all the details of OSHA regulations. 539
F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
147 Id. 391.
1481d.
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the Southern Railway approach. Under Southern Pacific, if another
agency regulates occupational safety and health in all areas of an
industry in a comprehensive manner, then OSHA should not regulate any area of that industry. 49 If another agency regulates occupational safety and health within some areas of an industry in a
comprehensive fashion than OSHA should act to regulate only
unregulated areas. 150 If another agency regulates only particular
hazards within an industry or an area of industry, OSHA should
be able to enforce regulations governing all remaining unregulated
hazards.'51
In its most recent pronouncement on its relationships with
OSHA, the FRA also recognized the important role OSHA plays in
regulating railroad working conditions. 152 The FRA abandoned
its earlier, rigid "territorial approach" 113 to railroad safety regulation. Instead of attempting to regulate all hazards within a general "territory," the FRA conceded that, even within such a general
territory, there were specific hazards which OSHA might regulate.
For example, although the FRA would regulate most conditions of
those employees engaged in laying welded track, OSHA would be
free to enforce its general standards for the handling of welding
54
apparatus.
C. The Need for Equally Stringent Regulation
An issue closely related to the scope of working conditions is
whether, in order to conclude that a specific working condition has
been regulated by another agency, it is necessary that the preempting agency's standards and enforcement powers provide proOSHRC decisions have generally
tection equivalent to OSHA's.'5"
149
For example, OSHA regulates no aspect of the mining industry, because it
is covered by the Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. 30 U.S.C.
§801-962 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (as amended).
50If railroad locomotives are comprehensively regulated, for example, but
railroad repair facilities are not, OSHA could regulate repair facilities.
151 See, e.g., Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., O.S.A.H.R.C. No. 7674 (Microfiche
No. 75/20/E12), [1975-761 OSHD ff20,250 (1975) (OSHA regulations of safety
shoes on loading docks are not pre-empted by Department of Transportation regulations of other aspects of the trucking industry).
15243 Fed. Reg. 10,583-90 (1978).
53 The "territorial" approach meant that FRA standards would have applied
to "certain enumerated railroad work places, properties, facilities, structures, and
equipment" instead of specific hazards. Id. 10,584.
154 See id. 10,585.
'55 If the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), for example, regulates noise
exposure levels for maintenance personnel by establishing maximum noise levels,
would these FAA regulations supplant OSHA regulations setting both maximum
noise levels and required protective ear equipment?
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concluded that another agency's regulations of a specific working
condition will automatically pre-empt similar, and more stringent,
OSHA regulations. This principle was first announced in Mushroom Transporation Co. 156 That case held that Department of
Transportation (DOT) regulations for the immobilization of trucks
while unloading pre-empted more stringent OSHA regulations.1157
DOT required only that parking brakes be set, while OSHA had
required both parking brakes and wheel chocks. This approach violates the general principle that section 4(b)(1) should
be read to provide maximum worker protection. Nonetheless, the
courts and OSHRC have followed it consistently. 158 A superior
approach would require that, in order to pre-empt OSHA, another
agency must prescribe regulations which reduce or eliminate the
hazards of a specific working condition to a degree comparable to
the displaced provisions. Moreover, OSHA has procedures which
are easily adapted to such a standard. 159 This approach does not
mean that OSHA regulations would always prevail, but it does
mean that another agency's regulations would have to be measured
against OSHA's standards. 160
O.S.A.H.R.C. 64 [1973-74] OSHD 1116,881 (1973).
157 The OSHRC stated that, "Once another Federal agency exercises its authority over specific working conditions, OSHA cannot enforce its own regulations
covering the same conditions. Section 4(b)(1) does not require that another
agency exercise its authority in the same manner or in an equally stringent manner."
Id. at 67, [1973-74] OSHD 1 16,881, at 21,591.
158 See, e.g., Texas E. Transmission Corp., 20 O.S.A.H.R.C. 712, O.S.A.H.R.C.
No. 4078 (Microfiche No. 76/59/Cll), slip op. at 9, [1975-76] OSHD 1120,092,
at 23,901 (1975); American Airlines, O.S.A.H.R.C. No. 9392 (Microfiche No.
75/2/C13), slip op. at 7, [1975-76] OSHD 120,129, at 23,947 (1975). See
M. RoSTmsni, supra note 12, at § 19(1).
1565

' 59 0SHA's section on state jurisdiction provides for state assertion of authority
over "one or more safety or health issues," if the Secretary of Labor finds that the
state standards "are or will be at least as effective" as OSHA standards which relate
to the same issues. 29 U.S.C. §667(c)(2) (1976).
In order to satisfy the
Secretary of the effectiveness of its standards, the state must ensure inspection
rights, adequate funds, qualified personnel, and record-keeping requirements
equivalent to OSHA's. Id. § 667(c) (3)-(7). Nothing prevents the same standard
being applied with respect to other federal agencies.
In addition, § 6(d) of OSHA provides that an employer may obtain a variance
from any OSHA standard, if he can prove that the alternative protection provided
ensures workplace conditions "as safe and healthful as those which would prevail
if he complied with the OSHA standard." 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1976). At least two
early OSHRC decisions interpreting § 4(b) (1) did in fact suggest that employers
who felt that working conditions regulated by OSHA were already covered by
another agency could apply for variances under § 6(d). Sigman Meat Co., 8
O.S.A.H.R.C. 216, 218 [1973-74] OSHD 1117,783, at 22,139 (1974); Fineberg
Packing Co., 7 O.S.A.H.R.C. 405, 408 [1973-74] OSHD 1f17,518, at 21,976 (1974).
160 Notes 28-58 supra & accompanying text discuss OSHA's stringent standards
and enforcement powers.
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Making pre-emption conditional upon equivalent protection
would favor OSHA's "hazard-expertise" over the "industry-" 161
or "hazard-expertise" 162 of another agency. 163 There are a number of reasons for favoring OSHA's hazard-expertise over the industry-expertise of another agency. First, because OSHA has developed
expertise in a number of different industries and has a constituency
larger than a single industry, it is much less likely to be "captured"
by industry interests than is an agency which deals only with one
industry. 64 Second, preferring OSHA over other agencies would
help end fragmentation of safety and health programs by centralizing them in one agency. 165 In addition, OSHA's hazard-expertise
should be preferred over the hazard-expertise of another agency.
OSHA has unique enforcement powers' 6 6 which can be utilized
to provide workers with maximum occupational safety and health
protection. These strong enforcement powers would be wasted if
OSHA could not enforce its safety regulations.
In practice, requiring protection at least equivalent to OSHA's
would encourage interagency consultation before the issuance of
occupational safety and health regulations in areas of overlapping
concern, a procedure which is already followed in some cases.167
OSHA should exercise its responsibilities in a manner which assures
effective protection and tries to avoid redundant regulation. There
161 Agencies such as the FRA and DOT have industry-expertise. Their primary
expertise and experience is with matters affecting their regulated industries as a
whole. Such expertise should be made available to and utilized by any other
agency regulating working conditions within that industry.
162 Agencies with hazard-expertise are agencies which, rather than regulating
a particular industry, regulate specific conditions common to many or all industries.
The EPA, OSHA, and the Consumer Products Safety Commission are agencies that
play such a role.
163 This approach rejects the approach suggested in Southern Pacific, that the
FRA as "the dominant agency in its limited area" should automatically be the
ultimate arbiter of occupational safety and health standards in the railroad
industry. 539 F.2d 386, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
164 See generally Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HArv. L. REv. 1669, 1683-88 (1975).
165 "The fragmentation of various job safety and health responsibilities among
the Departments of Labor, HEW, Interior, and other agencies and departments
inevitably fostered jurisdictional jealousies and bureaucratic infighting that inhibited
the development of a broad federal program to protect every worker." J. PAcE
& M. O'BmCN, BrrrEn WAgEs 139 (1973) (describing the original impetus for
OSHA). See 106 CONG. PEC. 37,325 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Williams), reprinted in LEisL& E HISTORY, supra note 1, at 414 (noting that safety programs
prior to OSHA have "represented a piecemeal approach which provides no protection for the great majority of American workers").
166 See notes 49-58 supra & accompanying text.
167 See M. RoasEwn, supra note 12, at § 18 (noting that OSHA has signed
at least twelve agreements for interagency cooperation).
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need not be any duplication of regulations, because working conditions would be subject to either OSHA's or another agency's jurisdiction but not to both. Thereby, regulatory efforts would not be
wastefully duplicative.
Even when another agency provides regulations which are as
stringent as OSHA's, there is still the possibility that the other
agency will have enforcement powers inferior to OSHA's. One
solution to this disparity in enforcement powers is to permit joint
enforcement by OSHA and the other agency. OMICA specifically
left open the question whether consistent "with Congressional interest [sic], EPA and the Department of Labor may agree that the
Department of Labor will exercise its OSHA enforcement powers
in conjunction with and reenforcement of EPA's exercise of its
statutory authority." 168 Although the phrase, "[n]othing in this
chapter shall apply to working conditions . . . " in section 4(b)(1)
can be interpreted to stop OSHA from concurrent enforcement, 169
such an interpretation would undermine OSHA's efforts at providing maximum occupational safety and health protection according
to the purpose of the Act. Concurrent enforcement, therefore,
should be allowed in most 170 cases, with precautions taken to minimize interagency conflicts and to maximize cooperation. 171
In deciding whether to exercise concurrent enforcement powers,
the Department of Labor should first determine whether its own
enforcement powers are necessary to ensure that the targeted workers
are receiving protection consistent with OSHA's purpose. Although
this may require some evaluation by OSHA of another agency's
168520 F.2d 1161, 1170 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
169 See note 6 supra, for complete text of § 4(b)(1).
170 There are situations in which employees' working conditions are appropriately regulated by agencies other than OSHA. This should occur only when
Congress has expressly stated that workers should be subject to different enforcement powers. The best example of this is the Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977. 30 U.S.C. §§ 822-962 (Supp. II 1978).
It is significant that in creating the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA), Congress did not require workers to sacrifice occupational protection. Congress provided that MESA would have strong enforcement powers
similar to OSHA's. Employee rights covered by MESA include the right to initiate
and participate in inspections and protection against employer retaliation for making complaints and refusing to perform hazardous work. See id. §§ 813(g), (h)
820(b)(1); notes 55, 57 & 58 supra.
Employers covered by the Mine Safety and Health Act are subject to unannounced inspections, are required to keep records and to make these records
accessible to employees, and must post notices of standards and citations. 30
U.S.C. §§813(a), 821, 817 (Supp. II 1972). See 29 U.S.C. §§657(c), 658(b)
(1976), for similar OSHA standards.
171 Both practical and legal problems are minimized when the other agency
agrees to concurrent enforcement.
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statutory enforcement powers, this task should not be unduly difficult or beyond OSHA's expertise. 17 2 The complexity of this process
would be mitigated in situations in which the other agency has requested OSHA's enforcement assistance in apparent recognition of
173
its own limited enforcement powers.
Finally, some employee enforcement rights are unique to
OSHA and should not be abandoned regardless of whether concurrent enforcement is allowed. Foremost among these rights is the
recently recognized right to refuse to perform imminently hazardous work.1 4 Elimination of this right in some cases, as a result of
section 4(b)(1) pre-emption, would lead to inconsistent and anomalous results. It would mean that a farmworker could refuse some
highly dangerous work-such as using a tractor with no rollover-bar
protection-which OSHA regulates, but not other dangerous work
-such as entering a field that is being crop-dusted-which EPA regulates. It would also be against the weight of policy behind
OSHA, because it would deprive many workers of essential protection.
D. OSHA's Role in Regulating Pesticide Working Conditions
after OMICA
The definition of "working conditions" and the concept of
equivalent protection are important in determining the scope of
OSHA's authority over farmworker expsoure to pesticides. Despite
OMICA, OSHA may still be able to issue several types of regulation
in this area. The first type of regulation would be more stringent
175
OSHA regulations aimed at the same problems as EPA regulations.
Although the OMICA decision suggests that OSHA would not be
able to issue more stringent regulations, 1 6 such a result would be
contrary to public policy. To bar OSHA from promulgating more
stringent regulations would prevent farmworkers from obtaining
the effective occupational safety and health protections envisioned
by OSHA's drafters.
A second area of concern is whether OSHA could adopt regulations which fall within the general category of worker exposure to
172 For an example of how this assessment process could work, see Puget
Sound Tug & Barge, No. 76-4905 [1978] OSHD 1r22,635 (ALJ) (evaluating OSHA
and Coast Guard Inspections).
'

73

See note 171 supra & accompanying text.

174 See note 58 supra.
175 OSHA pesticide regulations require longer re-entry periods and cover more
pesticides than do EPA's regulations. See notes 30-34 supra & accompanying text.
176 520 F.2d 1161, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (once the EPA has jurisdiction
OSHA is precluded from acting).
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pesticides, but which deal with particular hazards not covered by
EPA. 177 If a definition of working conditions distinguishing specific hazards from general categories were adopted,1 78 such regulations would not be pre-empted. The EPA's exercise of authority
over some hazards, such as field re-entry times, within the general
category of farmworker pesticide-exposure conditions would not prevent OSHA from regulating unregulated hazards within the same
general category. There is no evidence that EPA has considered,
and rejected as unnecessary, regulation of these separate unregulated
hazards. 179 However, even if EPA had found regulation necessary,
requiring another agency to offer protections comparable to OSHA's
would leave the Department of Labor free to regulate these additional hazards until adequate alternative standards are set.
Finally, there is the question whether OSHA can promulgate
regulations in areas related to pesticide exposure but which EPA
does not regulate at all, such as recordkeeping, medical monitoring,
and worker education and training. 8 0 These types of OSHA regulations would be permitted under two lines of analysis. The first is
that OSHA should not be pre-empted, because these requirements
are aimed at particular unregulated hazards within the general category of pesticide exposure regulated by EPA.18' The second view is
that such OSHA regulations are not subject to section 4(b)(1) at
177For example, EPA regulations do not cover the distance farmworker's
housing or dining areas must be located from fields where pesticides spraying takes
place, protections (including protective equipment) for farmworkers who load and
carry hand spraying equipment or for workers who load cropdusting planes, and
precautions for storage of pesticides to avoid inadvertent exposure and accidents.
See generally Proceedings of the National Conference on Protective Clothing and
Safety Equipment for Pesticide Workers, in Atlanta, Ga., 137-38 (May 1-2, 1972).
In addition, the particular hazard at which EPA re-entry times are directed is
immedate exposure. The dangers of long-term exposure are not regulated. See
6 JoB SAFETY & HEALTH 20, 22 (1978) (monthly OSHA publication) (discussion
of the dangers of long-term exposure to pesticides).
178 Southern Pacific included the regulation of specific items within its flexible
definition of working conditions. 539 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 874 (1977). Southern Railway did not, 539 F.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).
179The clear focus of EPA regulations has been field re-entry times.
See
Farmworkers in Jeopardy, supra note 22, at 73-82. EPA officials privately admit
that the original re-entry times are inadequate and that there is a need to establish additional standards. Conversation with staff member, U.S. EPA (Feb. 20,
1980) (confidential source).
180 See text accompanying notes 36-45 supra.
181 See notes 148-54 supra & accompanying text. It is only when another
agency issues requirements in these areas that OSHA is pre-empted. See Southern
Pac. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
874 (1977); Ruan Trans. Corp., 3 O.S.A.H.R.C. 364, [1971-73] OSHD
15,715
(1973) (ALJ) (DOT recordkeeping requirements for the railroad and trucking
industries pre-empt similar OSHA requirements within those industries).
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all, because they do not really regulate conduct directly "affecting
occupational safety or health." 182 Under this approach, even if
EPA had pre-empted all other OSHA requirements within the pesticide exposure area, OSHA recordkeeping and similar monitoring
83
requirements would not be pre-empted
V. Tim TiRDn TEST: "EXERCISES STATUTORY AUTHoiUTY"
A. DistinguishingBetween Actual and Proposed Regulation
The phrase "exercises statutory authority" 184 in section 4(b)(1 )
raises the issue whether potential but unexercised power to regulate, proposed regulations, or actual regulations of another federal
agency are necessary in order to pre-empt OSHA. The courts and
the OSHRC have consistently required the actual exercise of statutory authority by another agency before finding OSHA preempted.'8 8 These decisions have been guided by the language of
section 4(b)(1), the legislative history, and the principle that section
4(b)(1) should be read narrowly in order to prevent gaps in protec88
tion.1
The problem continues to recur, however. For example, there
is currently an unresolved question whether the declaration of an
intent to regulate particular hazards, appearing in a policy state182 This approach to recordkeeping requirements was adopted in Bettendorf
Terminal Co., 8 O.S.A.H.R.C. 343, 346, [1973-74] OSHD 1f17,782, at 22, 136
(1974).

183 Id.

This approach is generally accepted.

See M. Rorar'~r, supra note

12, at § 162.
This discussion of possible conflicts between OSHA farmworker pesticideexposure regulations and existing EPA requirements is purely hypothetical. Since
OMICA, OSHA has taken no further action on pesticide regulation.
184 See note 6 supra, for text of § 4(b) (1).
18 See Southern Ry. v. OSHRC, 539 F.2d 335, 340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 999 (1976); Southern Pac. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 392-93 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
See also Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
OSHRC, 548 F.2d 1052, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Consolidated Freightways Corp.,
O.S.A.H.R.C. No. 10889 (Microfiche No. 77/84/A2), [1977-78] OSHD g21,846
(1977); Union Pac. R.R., O.S.A.H.R.C. Nos. 13214, 13251, 13337 (Microfiche No.
77/151/A2), [1977-78] OSHD f 22,042 (1977).
38 6 See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. OSHRC, 548 F.2d 1052, 1054 (D.C. Cir.
1976) ("The Congressional purpose [of OSHA] . . . would surely be set at naught
by a construction of the word 'exercise' to the effect that . . . the mere initiation
of proposed rulemaking [by another agency] fences off the subjects of that proposal
from OSHA."); Southern Pac. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977) ("Section 4(b)(1) requires an actual 'exercise'
of 'authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations' . . . [The] bare
announcement that the FRA is considering promulgation of regulations does not
suffice . . ."); Southern Ry. v. OSHRC, 539 F.2d 335, 336-37 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976) (quoting from the legislative history and concluding
that a requirement of actual exercise of authority is "clear not only from the
statutory language but from the legislative history as well").
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ment, s 7 constitutes an exercise of authority sufficient to pre-empt
existing OSHA regulations for those particular hazards. 88 For
the most part, however, "exercise" is interpreted to mean actual
exercise.
The interpretation of "exercise" did not arise in OMICA,
because EPA had actually promulgated regulations, and OSHA's
regulations were inoperative at the time.18 9 However, because of
the close relationship between the exercise-of-authority and scopeof-working-conditions issues,190 the definition of "exercise" is relevant to future OSHA efforts with respect to pesticides. For example, EPA has not yet established pesticide re-entry periods
for pubescent children. 191 The lack of actual exercise of statutory
authority by the EPA, alongside a narrow definition of working
conditions, 192 would permit OSHA to provide young farmworkers
with pesticide protection.
B. The Failureto Enforce
The current status of enforcement efforts for regulations
promulgated by federal agencies raises the issue whether, when an
agency fails to effectively enforce its promulgated regulations, it
187 For instance, the Federal Railway Administration's recent policy statement
declared an intent to regulate specific hazards. 49 C.F.R. §§ 209.1-209.215 (1979).
158Compare Consolidated Rail Corp., O.S.A.H.R.C. Nos. 78-1504, 78-1779,
[1980] OSH-D ff24,210 (ALJ) (OSHA citation for failure to guard open pits
vacated, because FRA policy statement constituted valid exercise of statutory
authority) with Consolidated Rail Corp., O.S.A.H.R.C. No. 78-3100 [1979] OSHD
1123,562 (AL) (OSHA citation for failure to guard open pits affirmed, because
FRA policy statement was not formal rulemaking and therefore did not constitute
valid exercise of authority). Accord St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., O.S.A.H.R.C.
No. 78-4661, [1979] OSHD 723,973 (ALJ (FRA policy statement does not constitute the exercise of statutory authority).
Contra Consolidated Rail Corp.,
O.S.A.H.R.C. No. 78-4881, [1979] OSHD I[23,905 (ALJ) (FRA statement is a
valid exercise of authority).
189 EPA issued final regulations on May 10, 1974, effective June 10, 1974.
39 Fed. Reg. 16,888 (1974). OSHA had issued temporary emergency standards
on June 29, 1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 17,214 (1973). However, these regulations were
voided on January 12, 1974. Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't
of Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974). OSHA had originally intended to re-issue
permanent pesticide standards, but never did. All OSHA regulations were
officially revoked on August 12, 1974. 38 Fed. Reg. 28,878 (1974). See generally
Farmworkers in Jeopardy, supra note 13, at 78-82; Farmworkers, Pesticides and
OSHA, supra note 16, at 44-48.
190 In order to pre-empt OSHA, another agency's exercise of statutory authority
must apply to "working conditions." 29 U.S.C. § 653(b) (1) (1976). Therefore,
the determination of how "working conditions" should be defined directly affects
the determination whether an agency, other than the Department of Labor, has
exercised statutory authority.
191 National Assoc. of Farmworker Orgs. v. Marshall, No. 79-1578, slip op.
at 6 n.7, 48 U.S.L.W. 2633 (D.C. Cir. March 20, 1980).
192 See notes 148-54 supra & accompanying text.
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can be said that that agency is "exercising" its statutory authority
in a manner which pre-empts OSHA. Before considering this
question, the reasons an agency may fail to enforce promulgated
regulations should be noted. The failure to enforce can be due to
a lack of sufficient statutory authority or due to inadequate effort.
Both factors are relevant to determining the meaning of "exercise."
However, because the approach advocated by this Comment would
prevent an agency that lacks sufficient statutory authority from
pre-empting OSHA, 193 it is only when an agency shows inadequate
enforcement efforts, despite sufficient statutory authority, that this
issue should arise.
The term "exercise" must be interpreted to encompass only
the active enforcement of promulgated regulations. Once it is
apparent that opportunities exist for an agency to enforce promulgated regulations, an agency must enforce them. If the agency fails
to enforce its regulations, the courts and the OSHRC should not
consider OSHA pre-empted. This interpretation of "exercise" is
consistent with OSHA's broad purpose and will avoid many of the
problems which the courts found objectionable when they rejected
the "proposed" regulation interpretation of "exercise." 194 An
agency's mere issuance of proposed regulations was not considered
sufficient exercise of authority to pre-empt OSHA, because workers
would have been deprived of OSHA protections without benefit of
alternative protections. 195 The same reasoning is applicable to this
situation. The OMICA decision assumed that the EPA had the
statutory capacity and the willingness to provide effective protection
to farmworkers. 196 However, experience has demonstrated that
EPA has failed to "exercise" authority in matters affecting farmworker occupational safety and health in a manner consistent with
public policy. If EPA is not exercising its authority, section 4(b)(1)
should not prevent OSHA from stepping in.
Indeed, it is doubtful whether EPA has the statutory capacity
to provide adequate farmworker protections. As noted earlier,
EPA's statutory authority under FEPCA is not geared to enforcing
farmworker protections. 1 97 In addition, the 1978 amendments to
93

3

See text following note 87 supra.

194 See notes 184-86 supra &accompanying text.
195 Id.
196 520 F.2d 1161, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (farmworkers termed the "most
obvious object of the bill's protection" and noted that the EPA has "the authority
to provide that [farmworker] protection").
97
2
See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
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the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act further
lessen the EPA's statutory authority, by giving much of the EPA's
enforcement authority back to the states. 198
EPA's statutory limitations are compounded by the agency's
failure to enforce regulations designed to provide farmworkers with
pesticide protection. 199 The agency has not devoted adequate resources to this area. EPA's Office of Enforcement is responsible for
enforcement of all laws pertaining to hazards and pollutants within
198 See note 8 supra. These amendments provide vague criteria for transferring "primary enforcement responsibility" to the states. 7 U.S.C. § 136w-1(a)
(Supp. II 1978). This transfer is automatic for the vast majority of states.
7 U.S.C. § 136w-l(b) (Supp. II 1978). See Note, Primary Enforcement Responsibility for Pesticide Use Violations Under the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978,
55 INn. L.J. 139, 144-47 (1979).
These amendments do not strip the "EPA of all power to enforce laws regulating pesticide use." Id. 139. EPA retains the right to intervene whenever a
state has not "commenced appropriate action" within 30 days of a referral of
complaint received by the EPA. 7 U.S.C. § 136w-2(a) (Supp. II 1978). However,
not only is the definition of "appropriate action" unclear, but EPA investigation at
such a late date is almost useless since pesticide residues have long since disappeared. EPA procedures for recission of a state's authority are currently unclear
and are likely to be time-consuming. See Note, supra, 55 IND. L.J. at 149. This
authority has not been used. RuRAL AmmucA, March 1980, at 7, col. 2.
This transfer of authority is likely to cause enforcement of pesticide regulations
to be even more ineffective than before. State personnel may be limited in number,
untrained, and lack the authority to apply civil penalties. Id. at 7, col. 3-4. State
enforcement programs are usually administered through a state's department of
agriculture. These departments may lack dedication to pesticide enforcement,
because they are subject to "intense pressure from local agricultural and pesticide
interests." Comment, The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1970:
A Compromise Approach, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 277, 306 n.150 (1973). They are
unlikely to have the "interest and the will to enforce worker-protection laws."
Testimony of Ralph Highstone before- the House Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations (June 1979), quoted in RuRAL AmmucA, March 1980, at 8, col. 4.
If OSHA were to regulate pesticides, the state enforcement of federal standards
would not pre-empt OSHA. Section 4(b) (1) deals with the exercise of authority
by federal, not state, agencies. In addition, one of the purposes of enacting OSHA
was to remedy the failure of state programs to provide adequate occupational
safety and health protection. See 116 CONG. REG. 37,325 (remarks of Sen.
Williams); id. 37,628-9 (remarks of Sen. Cranston), H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1970), reprinted in

LEGISLATVE

HISTORY, supra note 1, at

413 (Sen. Williams), 519 (Sen. Cranston), 845 (H.R. REP,. No. 1291). To allow
state enforcement without OSHA protections would undermine an explicit purpose
underlying OSHA's enactment. See 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1976) (OSHA provision
allowing states to regain some pesticide authority, but subject to OSHA safeguards).
199EPA has allowed labels on many pesticides to remain out-of-date, and,
therefore, they do not contain much of the information required by law, including
re-entry times. RURAL AXmEucA, March 1980, at 7, col. 2. One of the reasons
that EPA has sought OSHA's assistance in enforcement is that a substantial number
of labels do lack re-entry times. Telephone conversation with John Ulfelder of
EPA's Office of Enforcement (April 3, 1980). One study showed that of 28
pesticides checked, 22 labels were either missing or contained inadequate precautionary statements. W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENvmO NmENTAL LAW § 8.5,
at 868-9 n.30 (1977). Since EPA enforces FIFRA through penalties for use of a
pesticide in a manner contrary to instructions on its label, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(2) (G),
improper labelling makes enforcement impossible.
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EPA's jurisdiction, but pesticide control has been given a low priority.200 There is no EPA enforcement effort specifically directed
toward worker protection. In 1976, EPA's enforcement staff of
fifty-two undertook 1500 investigations, of which less than ten percent involved farmworkers. 20 1 EPA's already small FIFRA enforcement staff is now down to fifteen.202 Although part of this reduction may be attributed to the transfer of major enforcement
responsibility to the states, 20 3 that is not a sufficient justification for
such a drastic decline in enforcement effort. Immediate investigations of pesticide complaints are essential, because residues dissipate
within 48-72 hours, yet it generally takes EPA investigators one to
three weeks to investigate a complaint.20 EPA has a very poor
record of response to numerous specific complaints of farmworker
pesticide poisonings. 20 5 Very few employers have been fined by the
200
EPA for violation of its worker protection regulations.
Clearly, EPA has failed to adequately "exercise" its authority
in the pesticide area. Farmworkers, suffering because of the EPA's
failure to enforce its regulations, should not be denied OSHA protections. The courts and the OSHRG should be willing to decide
that an agency has failed to enforce promulgated regulations and is
no longer exercising authority in such situations.
200

RunA. AMEBICA, March 1980, at 7, col. 4.
See Statement of Charles Horwitz, supra note 14, at 6. Although EPA does
not keep precise data on the number of FIFRA investigations involving farmworkers,
it is clearly a small percentage. The majority of EPA's enforcement activities focus
on inspection of producer and marketplace establishments. Fewer resources are
devoted to "use inspections." This category is further broken down into "use
observations," "experimental-use observations," and "misuse investigations" which
are based on complaints. Approximately half of use inspections involve agricultural
use, and the rest involve pest control in homes and buildings. Many of the
agricultural misuse investigations involve complaints not dealing directly with
farmworkers; for example, failure to comply with the required waiting period
between the last spraying and the harvesting of fruits is a frequent complaint.
Conversation with John Ulfelder, EPA Office of Enforcement (April 3, 1980).
202 Conversation with John Ulfelder, EPA Office of Enforcement (April 3,
1980).
203
See notes 198 & 8 supra.
2 04
See Statement of Charles Horwitz, supra note 14, at 7.
205
See generally id.
20
6 One source reports that out of 149 reported violations that EPA's Office of
Enforcement recorded in 1977-78, EPA levied just four fines-three for $1,000 and
one for $100-and issued 22 "notices of warning" for improper pesticide use. Not
one case was forwarded to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. RunaL
Am cA, March 1980, at 8, col. 4. Another source states that, "civil penalty proceedings arising out of misuse are virtually non-existent." W. RODGERS, liANDBOOE
ON ENvmoNMENTAL LAw, § 8.09, at 898.
This lack of adequate enforcement effort has resulted in the filing of a petition
with the EPA by migrant farmworkers exposed to dangerous pesticides and two
farmworker organizations requesting further EPA action. See EPA Petition, supra
note 13, at 12.
201
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CONCLUSION

Some recent interpretations of section 4(b)(1) have denied farmworkers the protections that OSHA was designed to provide. These
decisions have suggested or held that, in order for an agency to preempt OSHA, Congress need not have had as a purpose of the enacted legislation the protection of occupational safety and health; 207
that the regulation of one hazard by an agency can prevent OSHA
from regulating different hazards; 208 that promulgated regulations
by a pre-empting agency need not offer substantive protection comparable to OSHA; 209 that the enforcement power of the preempting agency may be extremely limited; 210 and that a pre-empt211
ing agency need not be diligent in enforcing its regulations.
This Comment has examined these decisions and concluded
that they lack sensitivity to the broad purposes of OSHA. An
approach that construes exemptions from section 4 (b) (1) narrowly
is advocated. In order to pre-empt OSHA, another federal agency
should have to promulgate regulations whose central purpose is the
preservation or attainment of occupational safety and health on a
par with that attained by OSHA. OMICA's holding, giving the
EPA primary jurisdiction over protection against pesticides, should
be overruled. Barring that, there is great potential for OSHA to
provide additional safeguards to workers, if the courts and the
OSHRC define the scope of pre-emption narrowly and require
active enforcement of promulgated regulations as a condition of
pre-emption. Absent such measures, farmworkers-and workers in
general-may be denied the congressionally mandated protections
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.
207
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text following note 87 supra and text accompanying notes 95-97 supra.
text accompanying notes 141-44 supra.
text accompanying notes 156-58 supra.
text accompanying notes 45-58 supra.
text following note 198 supra and notes 199-206 supra & accompanying

